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Executive Summary 
 
As an outcome of a 2006 review of e-security arrangements, the Attorney-General's 
Department was tasked to develop a cyber exercise program to improve the ability 
of governments and critical infrastructure owners and operators to manage 
incidents affecting the National Information Infrastructure. As part of this role, the 
Attorney-General’s Department coordinated a national cyber exercise, Cyber Storm 
II. 
 
Cyber Storm II was structured and executed as a large-scale national exercise 
within an international framework. Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US were 
participants. Australia’s participation was second only to the United States, and 
involved Australian Government agencies, state and territory governments and the 
largest contingent of private sector organisations ever involved in an Australian 
Government-sponsored exercise. The exercise structure allowed participants to 
exercise their internal incident response and communications in a national 
framework that allowed external communications to be more than notional and 
which encouraged a collaborative response. 
 
Cyber Storm II was conducted as a “no-fault” exercise. Its purpose was not to 
obtain a stock-take of participant’s internal crisis management arrangements. Nor 
was the exercise a test of the resilience of participant’s networks to cyber attack. 
The starting point for the exercise was that the adversary had sufficient time, 
money and motivation to penetrate any network.  
 
Many participants recognised that the global exercise framework provided by 
Cyber Storm II was an extremely cost-effective way of conducting an in-house 
cyber exercise. 
 
The exercise proved that the major elements of the national response arrangements 
are sound, but as expected also found a number of areas where improvement would 
be possible. This report captures key findings and participant’s observations as they 
relate to cyber incident response. 
 
The key findings are that crisis arrangements must be regularly reviewed and 
tested; established relationships facilitate rapid information sharing during a crisis; 
crisis communications procedures must be predicated on accurate and appropriate 
points of contact and formalised; cyber crises require tailored responses that take 
into account multiple inter-dependencies; and incident response is assisted by 
having clear escalation thresholds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recognising the increasing reliance of government, business and home users on 
information and communication technologies, the Australian Government 
established the E-Security National Agenda (ESNA) in 2001 to create a secure and 
trusted electronic operating environment for both the public and private sectors. As 
an outcome of a 2006 review, the Attorney-General's Department was tasked to 
develop a cyber exercise program to improve the ability of governments and 
critical infrastructure owners and operators to manage incidents affecting the 
National Information Infrastructure. As part of this role the Attorney-General’s 
Department coordinated a national cyber exercise, Cyber Storm II, which formed 
part of a larger international exercise and was designed to align with national e-
security objectives. 
 
In February 2006 the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cyber 
Security Division conducted the first US National Cyber Exercise, Cyber Storm, as 
part of its own national cyber exercise program. The Australian Government 
participated in Cyber Storm, conducting a discussion exercise. The second US 
national exercise was scheduled for March 2008, and the US invited Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to participate.  
 
Cyber Storm II was structured and executed as a large-scale national exercise 
within an international framework. This structure allowed participants to exercise 
their internal incident response and communications in a national framework that 
allowed external communications to be more than notional and which encouraged a 
collaborative response. It provided a unique opportunity for stakeholders across the 
spectrum of e-security and critical infrastructure protection in Australia to 
participate in a global cyber exercise aimed at testing the decision-making which 
underpins any technical response.  Cyber Storm II participants included Australian 
Government agencies, State and Territory governments, industry groups and 
private companies drawn from the IT industry and four critical infrastructure 
sectors - Water, Banking and Finance, Energy and Communications. Each 
participating organisation designed their exercise play to meet internal objectives 
while utilising the international framework and the extensive player set to 
realistically test their response and recovery to a large-scale cyber attack. 
 
The exercise was conducted from 10-14 March 2008.  The Australian component 
of Cyber Storm II was coordinated by an Australian Exercise Control Centre 
(AuExCon) established near Melbourne. Participants played the exercise from their 
usual work places using, where possible, normal communications channels.  
 
This report is a consolidation of findings, observations, and lessons learned 
throughout the planning and execution of Cyber Storm II. It is a compilation of 
observations provided by participants in a ‘hotwash’ debrief held immediately after 
the exercise, and in more formal one-on-one debriefings conducted in the weeks 
following the exercise.  
 
There are three points to bear in mind while reading this report: 
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i. Cyber Storm II was conducted as a “no-fault” exercise. The purpose of 
Cyber Storm II was not to obtain a stock-take of participant’s internal crisis 
management arrangements; 
ii. Cyber Storm II was not a test of the resilience of participant’s networks to 
cyber attack. The starting point for the exercise was that the adversary had 
sufficient time, money and motivation to penetrate any network; and 
iii. the findings and supporting comments in this report represent a wide range 
of opinions from a diverse player set. All are generalised to some extent – 
some are common observations, others the views of one or two players. 
This report should be read from the perspective of “could this apply to my 
organisation” rather than “who said that”. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Purpose 
Australia’s first national e-security exercise was designed to support the goals of 
the Australian Government’s E-Security National Agenda, encourage information 
sharing across various boundaries, and importantly, to facilitate participating 
organisations to meet their own internal objectives. 
 
The exercise enabled participants to test their response and recovery capabilities, 
test their information sharing arrangements and to promote awareness of e-security 
within their own organisation. The exercise scenarios were based on participants’ 
objectives and designed to stimulate technical, operational, communication and/or 
strategic responses to cyber incidents with a view to reviewing and refining current 
arrangements.  
 
2.2 Concept  
Planned in close coordination with, and driven by, its stakeholders and participants, 
the exercise focused on a series of cyber-specific events which were intended to 
escalate to a level requiring a coordinated national response. The adversary in 
Cyber Storm II utilised coordinated cyber attacks on the selected sectors to meet a 
specific political and economic agenda. A basic assumption within the exercise was 
that the adversary had sufficient resources and motivation to mount and 
successfully execute these attacks. The resulting impact on global cyber 
infrastructure, and associated physical infrastructure, was designed to prompt 
coordinated responses from the Australian Government and from within relevant 
industries, and to emphasise the interdependencies that exist in critical 
infrastructure and the national information infrastructure. 
 
2.3 Scope 
The scope of the exercise was defined to maximize the participants’ ability to 
assess, test or validate: 
• the full range of incident response and recovery mechanisms (technical, 
operation and strategic), 
• the spectrum of players involved from multiple sectors, across government 
and the private sector, 
• internal and external communications of organisations and sectors and with 
government, and 
• the need for continuing improvement to cyber security procedures and 
processes. 
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2.4 Objectives 
As a stakeholder-driven exercise, the objectives of participating organisations are 
broadly summarised to include the following objectives: 
• to examine internal capabilities to respond to, and recover from, a cyber 
attack, 
• to validate, examine and exercise information sharing relationships and 
communications paths for the collection and dissemination of cyber 
incident situational awareness, response, and recovery information, 
• to promote awareness and education of appropriate points of contact and 
correct procedures to use when responding to a cyber incident, and 
• to exercise, examine and validate international communication, cooperation 
and collaboration between participating governments. 
 
2.5 Scenarios 
Australian participants played varying combinations of 12 scenarios, some of 
which were intended to provoke international play. Scenarios were designed 
largely by the participants to meet their internal exercise objectives. All elements of 
these activities were simulated and did not impact any live networks - there were 
no physical consequences as a result of any of the scenarios.  Scenarios ranged 
from widespread internet degradation, to attacks on Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, through to the compromise of a Certificate 
Authority. 
 
2.6 Media Outreach  
The communication ‘real world’ media strategy to promote Australian participation 
in Cyber Storm II was prepared by the Public Affairs Branch of the Attorney-
General's Department. The communication strategy was developed to:  
 
• increase awareness of e-security issues;  
• promote Australian involvement in Cyber Storm II;  
• publicise the event; and  
• manage media issues as they arose. 
 
 Australia’s participation in Cyber Storm II was conducted in accordance with 
existing national security arrangements with the aim to build on the outcomes of 
the first Cyber Storm exercise. The Australian Government has a close working 
relationship with the business community and Cyber Storm II aimed to further 
develop that relationship. 
 
2.7 Planning and Execution 
Cyber Storm II planning took 18 months. The Attorney-General’s Department 
provided a framework in which participants could run an internal e-security 
exercise in conjunction with many of their suppliers and/or customers. The main 
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benefit was that external relationships, so often notional in a purely internal 
exercise, could be tested. 
 
This planning period was valuable not only to facilitate a world class exercise, but 
also as it enabled robust information sharing, and encouraged private-public sector 
relationships and coordination across industries and between competitors. Many 
participants also noted that the design process assisted them to engage various 
disparate sections of their organisation, creating convergence between business 
interests and technical expertise in crisis management communication. 
 
Others noted that the mere fact of participating in the planning process caused them 
to review (and in many cases repair) existing plans and processes. 
 
The Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) 
The MSEL provided the unfolding exercise scenario inputs in a manageable and 
observable format. This list was comprised of individual events, referred to as 
MSEL injects, that were “injected” into play throughout the exercise in various 
forms. Scripts for phone calls, emails, faxes and news media articles were 
developed. The MSEL injects also contained the expected player actions to assist 
the planners and observer/controllers in measuring player response. While much of 
the information in the database was scripted, the members of exercise control 
sometimes had to execute dynamic play in direct response to actual player actions. 
Key exercise control planners from participating organisations were intimately 
familiar with their respective organisation’s business, making them uniquely 
qualified to simulate the adversary, similar to the role of a “red team.” Assuming 
this kind of role provided the flexibility to increase or decrease the intensity of 
attacks or alter attack vectors. 
 
The MSEL management process utilised a software tool provided by the US 
Department of Homeland Security.  
 
Milestones in the planning process were marked by planning conferences.  The 
following is a breakdown of the 18-month planning and design period.  
 
Concept Development Conference (CDC) to Initial Planning Conference (IPC) 
In December 2006 the US held a concept development conference that gathered 
stakeholders, including Australia, to set out the exercise scope, goals, and 
objectives. The US exercise was planned using the concept of exercise ‘threads’ -
working groups that consolidated planning for each critical infrastructure sector 
involved in the exercise. Planners in the US worked in eight threads representing 
the chemical sector, the transportation sector (specifically rail and pipelines), 
Federal, States, international, information technology/communications 
(IT/Comms), law enforcement/intelligence (LE/I), and public affairs. The dedicated 
participation of the Federal and public affairs threads were a result of needs 
identified in Cyber Storm I.  Australia followed this model, creating planning 
threads for banking and finance, water, electricity, communications, information 
technology, government and public affairs.  
 
In March 2007, the growing Cyber Storm II community met in Washington at an 
IPC to finalise objectives and develop primary scenario paths. The 
IT/Communications thread produced a scenario menu which catalogued potential 
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scenarios, and the Law Enforcement/Intelligence (LE/I) thread began crafting the 
adversary for the exercise. Australia was represented at this meeting in the US 
IT/Communications, LE/I and international threads. 
 
In May an Australian IPC was held in Sydney. The point of the conference was to 
introduce the planners from the various participating organisations and to finalise 
exercise objectives for each of the participant’s internal exercises. 
 
IPC to Midterm Planning Conference (MPC) 
Planners focused on scenario concept design and development during this period, 
with threads beginning to craft scenarios that met their objectives and examined 
perceived vulnerabilities. A ‘trusted agent’ community, bound by signed 
agreements, enabled the sharing of sensitive information across industry and 
government via the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) portal. 
By the MPC, scenario concepts were formed and in the US the adversary 
framework was established.  
 
MPC to Final Planning Conference (FPC) 
Planners continued to develop depth in scenarios by confirming attack vectors, 
adversary requirements, business impacts and expected player actions. In the US, 
LE/I planners worked with other threads to assist shape malicious activity and 
coordinate adversary relationships. At the FPC, planners were required to report 
their progress on scenario injects to reconcile timing and other conflicts. In most 
cases, this was not actually achieved until the Final MSEL Conference (FMC). At 
the FPC, exercise planners were also familiarised with exercise mechanics issues 
such as establishing player sets and exercise contact lists, and the role of 
Observer/Controllers. Planners at the MPC were also trained in the use of the 
MSEL management tool. 
 
FPC to Final MSEL Conference (FMC) 
Following the FPC, planners began inputting scenario content into the MSEL tool. 
Thread meetings were held for various sectors in order to foster coordinated and 
coherent scenario development. In February 2008 planners met at the FMC to 
complete an inject-by-inject review of the exercise scenarios. Planners also learned 
about exercise control mechanics and protocols and Observer/Controller training 
requirements.  
 
Pre-Exercise build-up (Pre-Ex) and Execution 
The pre-ex period, which began in February 2008, was designed to prompt the 
identification and discussion of information sharing requirements between 
participating law enforcement, intelligence and private sector communities in 
preparation for the exercise.  
 
The exercise was conducted in March 2008. AuExCon, located in the Yarra Valley, 
served as the national coordinating body for the Australian exercise. USExCon was 
located in Washington DC.  AuExCon was in frequent contact with the US ExCon 
regarding the exercise mechanics and in order to facilitate international exercise 
play. The concept of a centralised coordinated exercise with decentralised 
execution was designed to be both practical and realistic for the players involved in 
the exercise across Australia and internationally.  
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At AuExCon, 45 individuals representing public and private sector organisations, 
sectors and industry groups monitored exercise play at the external locations 
through regular contact with observer/controllers via phone and email. Exercise 
control staff also responded to requests for information from players, coordinated 
real-time injects to facilitate play and supported all stakeholders to ensure 
objectives were met. Some Exercise control staff also simulated those entities not 
represented in the player set and notional companies.  
 
The Cyber Storm II MSEL was the driver for the entire exercise. It was the MSEL 
injects that set the pace of the exercise and elicited player responses 
 
Each thread leader was responsible for making coordinated and informed thread 
decisions. Thread leaders monitored MSEL injects and overall thread play. They 
also worked closely with the Exercise Managers, who also monitored upcoming 
injects, coordinated injects with each thread, verified the timing and validity of 
injects, and ultimately sent injects to players. As Cyber Storm II unfolded, the 
exercise design provided thread leaders and planners the flexibility to create new 
MSEL injects or alter existing injects to facilitate a logical game flow. These new 
or altered injects went through the same coordination process with subject matter 
experts in the relevant threads prior to dissemination, albeit on an expedited 
timeline. Planners and observer/controllers tracked inject edits and status changes 
throughout the exercise through the MSEL management tool and discussions with 
exercise control personnel. 
 
Given the time zone differences, play ranged from 0700hrs to 2300hrs during the 
course of the 3-day exercise, though the majority of play occurred between 0800 
hrs and 1800hrs, Australian Eastern Summer time. At the conclusion of each day’s 
play, thread leaders and the exercise management team met to assess key issues, 
exercise conditions and to provide a summary of the day’s play in preparation for 
the following day. On the last day, exercise control staff, the exercise management 
team and most observer/controllers attended a ‘hotwash’ debrief session at 
AuExCon to gather initial observations of the exercise play and key lessons 
learned.  
 
2.8 Security Policy 
The goal of Cyber Storm II information security policy was to ensure that any 
sensitive information shared during the exercise was only used for the stated 
objectives. The willingness of participants to disclose potentially sensitive 
information was one of the key factors in the success of the exercise, since it 
allowed: 
 
• the development of plausible, realistic and meaningful scenarios to 
maximise the value of the exercise, 
• planners to understand the implications of specific attacks on their 
infrastructure, and 
• planners to understand the responses expected from other planners and 
players from an organisational perspective. 
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The Cyber Storm II information security policy involved a multi-layered approach 
that included creating a trusted community and a secure network environment for 
exercise planning and execution.  
 
A Trusted Agent Agreement (TAA) was signed by all planners in Australia and 
essentially required individuals to comply with the US Department of Homeland 
Security Management Directive 11042.1: “Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified 
(For Official Use Only) Information.” Australian planners signed a version of the 
agreement consistent with applicable Australian law and all planners world wide 
signed a version of a similar agreement. Australian Government employees signed 
an acknowledgement of their responsibilities under both the Public Service Act 
1999 (Cth) and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
 
The obligations imposed upon exercise planners included a duty not to disclose any 
content containing any patent, trademark, trade secret or any other proprietary 
rights of any party. These obligations did not alter the obligations or release 
signatories from their responsibility to comply with contractual or fiduciary 
arrangements, obligations, or applicable international or Australian laws relating to 
the disclosure of sensitive information.  
 
Participants also agreed to adopt practices designed to reduce the possibility of 
security breaches and the introduction of malware into exercise systems and 
databases. All participants in the Australian national exercise have complied with 
these agreements for the duration of the planning, execution and “after action” 
processes.  
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3. Significant Findings 
Observations recorded during the exercise and in the post-exercise debriefs 
revealed several significant findings.  Comment on these arrangements focused on 
communication and escalation paths, organisational roles and responsibilities, and 
information sharing and coordination among organisations. The findings were 
determined with reference to the overarching objectives of the exercise and the 
findings included in this report reflect those that are applicable to both the private 
and public sector. Observations by individual organisations or sectors are grouped 
below to support these significant findings.   
 
Many participants noted that merely planning the exercise prompted internal 
reviews and modifications to their existing crisis arrangements.  
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Finding 1: Effective response is enhanced by routinely reviewing and testing 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Incident Response Plans and /or 
crisis management arrangements.  
 
Effective response to a cyber crisis is significantly enhanced by having tested 
procedures or arrangements, in which crisis-management relationships in the 
cyber response community are regularly reviewed to solidify communications paths 
and clarify organisational roles.  
 
Observations: 
a. Coordinated responses to an e-security crisis are required across the critical 
infrastructure protection community. Processes were often found to be 
oriented toward the mitigation of, and response to, physical threats.  More 
tailored and coordinated security response measures are needed to address 
cyber incidents, particularly when cyber threats have impacts across sectors.  
b. Participants noted that their own internal response mechanisms could be 
improved. Clarification of escalation procedures internally and externally, 
in addition to the identification of a communication plan to facilitate closer 
working relationships between business areas within organisations, were 
two common themes. 
c. Participants noted that in some circumstances formal processes tended to be 
circumvented under pressure or were not activated in a timely manner. 
d. Organisations that acted as information clearing houses or coordination 
bodies were under intense pressure during the exercise due to the number of 
scenarios.  Where formal protocols existed, under stress these tended to 
give way to informal processes. During a crisis the balance between formal 
and informal information sharing is likely to favour informal 
communication in order to facilitate rapid responses. It was also noted that 
informal processes outside of standard procedures could allow information 
to be lost. 
e. Many participants stated that a key value of Cyber Storm II was the 
opportunity it provided to test their internal procedures in a realistic 
scenario that included external stakeholders. This external element enabled 
organisations to assess their procedures more accurately and many 
participants cited this as a major benefit of Cyber Storm that cannot be 
replicated by exercising internally. 
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Finding 2: Non-crisis interaction among key stakeholders enhances effective 
crisis response during an incident. 
More frequent, non-crisis interaction between various stakeholders involved in 
protecting the national information infrastructure will enhance real world response 
capabilities. Established relationships facilitate rapid information sharing among 
community members and must include relationships across sectors, with suppliers, 
with vendors and with incident response organisations.  
 
Observations: 
a. The coordinated attacks simulated during Cyber Storm II highlighted the 
importance of pre-existing relationships between organisations prior to a 
crisis. This was particularly important in developing accurate situational 
awareness.  Participating organisations commented that maintaining 
situational awareness across related critical infrastructure sectors during a 
cyber attack was critical to ensuring effective response and recovery.  
b. Many participants reported that the exercise assisted in developing stronger 
relationships across and within sectors. A common theme was that the 18 
month planning process allowed relationships to be built up that would help 
in a genuine crisis. Most participants found Cyber Storm II to be a trust-
building exercise which will lead to greater information sharing and closer 
cooperation between participants in the real world.   
c. Participants noted that the internal communication between business areas 
in their organisation improved during Cyber Storm II. Participants also 
commented that the exercise, both in the planning and the execution, forced 
the organisation to engage across the whole business to address issues. This 
drove home the need to routinely engage with different business groups on 
cyber issues and as a result some organisations have already begun to 
identify an internal communication plan to facilitate closer working 
operations between different business areas. One participant found that the 
exercise identified many working groups that are dealing with substantially 
the same issues but were not aware of the commonality (due to the scale of 
the business). 
d. Many participants relied on sector-specific relationships (developed through 
Infrastructure Assurance Advisory Groups, for example) as focal points for 
sharing information during the exercise. In a coordinated attack, the 
underlying questions are how to contact another organisation similarly 
affected and who to contact within that organisation. This is especially true 
where there is no pre-existing relationship. Existing relationships are crucial 
as organisations are not able to create trusted relationships in the centre of a 
crisis.  
e. Interaction between participating private organisations and Australian 
Government agencies differed greatly between sectors. Some players noted 
that internal education on engagement with Government and law 
enforcement agencies would be undertaken following the exercise. 
Interaction outside established lines of communication between industry 
and law enforcement was a beneficial outcome of the exercise. 
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Finding 3: Crisis communication procedures, predicated on accurate and 
appropriate points of contact, must be formalised within contingency 
planning. 
 
Communication during a crisis significantly impacts the timeliness and 
effectiveness of responses. A unity of effort can be more effectively maintained 
when there is a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities and the interfaces 
between them. 
 
Observations: 
a. Greater clarity of roles and responsibilities at every level of response will 
greatly increase the ability of organisations to harness their own resources 
to address incidents. Coordination and cooperation internally within 
organisations was most efficient when roles and responsibilities were 
clearly defined. Likewise, communication between organisations was most 
effective when organisations had already identified who was responsible for 
what areas within external organisations. 
b. The exercise enabled players across sectors and government bodies to test 
and, in some cases, develop crisis communication procedures to respond to 
a cyber security incident. It was a common finding that crisis management 
procedures were oriented towards mitigating physical threats and that cyber 
incidents will require additional contacts within an organisation. Raising 
awareness around cyber incident response and how it differs from other 
emergency management responses was a valuable exercise outcome for 
many players and participants have indicated that they will further promote 
e-security education internally. 
c. A tangible result from the exercise for one participant was identification of 
the appropriate person to attend crisis management meetings during an e-
security incident.  This organisation found that during the exercise those 
attending the crisis meeting did not have the appropriate expertise. They 
identified a need for a high-level decision maker supported by a technical 
expert. This person has since been appointed 
d. Another participant discovered that their contractual arrangements outlining 
crisis communications did not reflect reality. The organisation has already 
reviewed these disparate arrangements and refined the protocols (including 
updating contact lists), to ensure consistency of real practice with SOPs.  
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Finding 4: Cyber crises require a tailored response that takes into account 
multiple interdependencies.  
 
The borderless nature of cyber attacks, and the speed with which they can escalate 
across infrastructure sectors, was demonstrated in Cyber Storm II. Contingency 
planning must include potential flow-on effects. 
 
Observations: 
a. Organisations noted that participation in the exercise was critical in 
exploring unforeseen interdependencies and escalation paths within and 
across sectors. An important learning was the need to formalise lines of 
communication between Government and industry to ensure that the scope 
of any problem is properly understood to enable a coordinated and effective 
response.  
b. Interdependencies within organisations were also explored during the 
exercise. Some industry players noted that a key value of the exercise was 
the opportunity it provided to stimulate the convergence of business and 
technical expertise in responding to incidents. Cyber Storm II was the 
impetus for ensuring more effective communication within separate 
functional areas for many organisations. A major benefit for one player was 
demonstrating the need to routinely engage with different functional areas 
on cyber issues.  
c. Several participants observed that more interaction across borders and 
sectors will improve the response capabilities of all concerned. One 
participant commented that Cyber Storm II amply demonstrated the benefit 
in “more people from more areas talking more often” about cyber security. 
d. One participant found that interdependencies existed within their own 
disparate functional business units, in addition to those discovered across 
sectors. For example, communication interdependencies were illustrated in 
relation to SCADA systems where visibility and ability to manage SCADA 
systems are compromised once communications are affected. When power 
supplies are affected by SCADA problems, the communications systems 
fail to function. One organisation has identified the need to test 
interdependencies in internal systems and between sectors in more depth in 
future exercises as a priority. 
e. Another participant noted that a unique benefit of the exercise was the 
opportunity to detect new areas of possible risk by observing the play of 
others.  They gathered invaluable information from watching the finance 
sector exercise.  
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Finding 5: Developing internal reporting and external notification thresholds 
assists in effective incident response by creating better situational awareness. 
 
Identifying the problem, rather than simply addressing the symptoms, is critical to 
effective cyber incident response. In order to ensure situational awareness within 
and between organisations, clear notification thresholds should be developed and 
promulgated so that technical incident responders know when escalation internally 
or externally is necessary.   
 
Observations: 
a. It was a common finding amongst participants that IT incident responders 
tend to focus on managing incidents rather than addressing the wider 
problem and its ramifications. A common observation was the tendency 
among IT incident responders to instinctively minimise the scale of the 
problem and to focus on what they knew or could manage when reporting 
to management. Many participants noted a need to educate incident 
responders to brief management on the limits of their understanding of 
problems, and the possible broader exposure faced by the organisation. 
b. The natural tendency to minimise the scale of the problem was also found 
to be true in many crisis committee meetings that were convened during the 
course of the exercise. Incident management meetings need to ask what the 
exposure ‘might’ be at worst case and develop strategies to minimise 
impact. They need also to be able to accept that the responders may not 
have all of the answers. 
c. A common problem, particularly in coordination centres, was that while 
responding to multiple incidents the responders failed to realise that there 
was a crisis. The focus tended to be on what was broken or performance 
metrics. 
d. One player stated that an exercise outcome was the clarification of 
guidelines to support escalation of IT security incidents with narrow 
spectrum impact to high priority status. This same company will also 
modify their crisis response plans to ensure that regular status updates are 
provided from crisis management teams to incident responders and vice 
versa.  
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Finding 6: Attempts to facilitate an interactive international game were 
hampered by time zone differences, isolated scenario building and unexpected 
player actions. 
 
International play was not extensive in the Australian national exercise. A longer 
pre-exercise build up, a longer exercise duration (to account for the 18 hour 
difference between Wellington and Washington) and more international 
communication during the exercise planning phase will need to be incorporated 
into Cyber Storm III.  
 
Observations: 
a. Attempts to facilitate international cooperation and communication through 
the Certificate Authority compromise were not successful. Despite high-
level efforts made by planners, the scenario did not escalate as planned and 
resulted in limited communication and coordination within the international 
community during the exercise.  
b. International play was severely hampered by the time difference. In essence 
the US exercise started a day later than the Australian exercise which meant 
that Australian play was winding down while the US play was winding up. 
c. Through the planning process, participants gained insight on how each 
nation or international organisation would respond to a cyber incident. 
Many participants commented that, with the benefit of hindsight, they 
would have planned and executed their scenarios differently to engage their 
own international partners. They did not fully capitalise on the framework 
and opportunities that Cyber Storm II provided to exercise as broadly as 
they could have.  
d. Players noted that the interactive international elements of Cyber Storm II 
were very appealing and an impetus for their involvement. For many 
organisations, participation in Cyber Storm III will depend on their ability 
and readiness to capitalise on the opportunity afforded by the international 
framework of the exercise. Many players noted that, in hindsight, they 
didn’t have the perspective to involve their international partners in Cyber 
Storm II as it was a completely new concept and they were unfamiliar with 
the likely execution of the exercise. They agreed that Cyber Storm III will 
allow them to build on these lessons and incorporate their international 
partners in the planning and design of Cyber Storm III. 
e. Some players noted that greater involvement with and interaction between 
Australia and New Zealand in particular should be pursued as part of any 
Cyber Storm III given the commonality of the issues and players. 
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Annexe A: Participating Organisations  
This list does not include six organisations that wish to remain anonymous. 
 
Non-government Participants 
AusCERT 
AusRegistry Pty Ltd 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
The Australian Domain Name Administrator 
Australian Securities Exchange 
CISCO Systems Australia 
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Country Energy 
Ergon Energy Corporation Ltd 
Energex Ltd 
Energy Networks Association 
Insurance Australia Group 
Internode Systems Pty Ltd 
Melbourne IT Ltd 
Microsoft Australia 
National Australia Bank 
Powerlink Queensland 
Singtel Optus Pty Ltd  
Suncorp Metway Ltd 
Telstra Corporation Limited 
Westpac Banking Corporation 
Woodside Energy Ltd 
 
Observers 
Attorney-General's Department – Emergency Management Australia 
Bank of Queensland 
Bendigo Bank 
Citigroup 
Foxtel 
IT Security Experts Advisory Group 
National Electricity Market Management Company 
QANTAS Airways Ltd. 
 
Commonwealth Agencies/Departments 
Attorney-General's Department 
Attorney-General's Department – GovCERT.au 
Attorney-General's Department – Protective Security Coordination Centre 
Australian Communications and Media Authority 
Australian Federal Police 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Centrelink 
Customs 
Defence Signals Directorate 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Department of Defence 
  
August 2008 Cyber Storm II Final Report           Page 20 of 20 
Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development & Local 
Government 
Department of Prime Minister& Cabinet 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism 
Office of National Assessments 
 
State Government 
SA Department for Transport, Energy & Infrastructure 
SA State Emergency Management 
WA Department of Premier and Cabinet 
WA Department of Treasury and Finance – ServiceNet 
 
